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The political consequences of redistricting the Tenth Legisla-
tive District. which comprises four g~og·r.aphically separated areas, is 
the subject of this thesis (see map. page vii). This area was chosen 
because of its unique characteristics. Previous to redistricting these 
areas comprised not only three different counties and legislative dis-
tricts, but three different congressional districts as well. 
Usually legislative districts are contiguous and the examina-
tion of one part separate from the whole is not practical unless it is 
a precinct analysis that is desired. Concurrent with the change in 
legislative district lines 1 many precincts assumed new dimensions and 
names, as well as lines, making comparison of precinct returns impossible. 
Having four separated areas al lows the examination of the voting patterns 
of much larger groups than precincts, and still permits a study of this 
dimension to be realized. A more comprehensive study would, no doubt, 
provide a better basis for analysis, but time and financial limitations 
negated this possibility. 
Each section, Whidbey Island, Camano Island, Bainbridge Island 
and the Northern part of the Kitsap Peninsula, can be observed both as 
a separate unit and as a member of an entire district. Each area is 
described as it existed prior to redistricting, and a short resume of 
the events leading up to redistricting is reviewed. The basi t: analysis 
concentrates on four major areas: 
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(2) The level of partisan strength• both before and 
after redistricting. 
(3) The effects of the "home-town" vote. 
(4) The effect of increased power in state elections 
as the segments become more influential in the 
total district.' 
Prior to examination of the s tati s ti cs on voting, a number of 
factors need to be understood. The data on the position of State 
Senator were eliminated, since this position was not filled by the 
electorate of the new Tenth District until 1968. Up to that time, 
Senator Dewey Donahue• from Southeastern Wa~hi ngton represented the 
"Tidewater Tehth 11 • * 
No absentee votes were included, as they are given for an entire 
area and the as$ignment of the votes to a particular area was impossible. 
The size of the. absentee vote was small and does not appreciably affect 
the data. The figures under the State Representative position represent 
the 11 drop-off11 effect make it impossible to determine the exact number 
voting in the State Representative position. 
The analysis contained in this study are based on. a three-point 
program. Statistical data were acquired through numerous public offices, 
including the Auditors' offices of the three counties involved, and the 
Elections Division of the Secretary of States's office. The data taken 
during the preapportionment period had to be extrapolated precinct by 
precinct for each candidate, as no other breakout was available. 
In light of the fact that the redistricting was essentially a 
political act, it was necessary to contact political leaders of both 
parties. Senator Robert Grei ve and Representative Gary Grant were con-
*Coined by Charles Elicker in his campaign of 1966. 
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sulted in relation to the philosophy held by the Democrats during the 
tirre that the Redistricting Act was in the developrrental stage. Slade 
Gorton was contacted as it was he who developed the Republi.can version 
of the Redi s tri cti ng Act. Richard · Schweitzer, a merrber of the Repub l i-
can Research Staff, provided a current county-by-county analysis of the 
1968 election, which is alluded to later. Finally, the statistical 
data obtained for the years 1962 through 1964 were compared with that 
obtained for the years 1966 through 1968 and the changes .in voting be-
havior were noted. 
Before attempting to draw conclusions on the basis of the sta-
tistics alone, this writer contacted the candidates involved, checked 
the newspaper for relative data, and, whenever possible, correlated 
these facts with information gained in background reading. As a candi-
date for the State Legislature in the Tenth District in 1966, this 
writer had personal conversations with candidates and political leaders 
that have aided his understanding of this area. 
ix 
CHAPTER I 
DESCRIPTION OF PREAPPORTIONED AREA 
"President Eisenhower's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
in 1955, came to the conclusion that the more the role of the states in 
our system is emphasized, the more important it is that the State Legis-
la_ture be. reasonably representative of the people. 11 1 In 1956 • the 
League of Women Voters submitted an initiative to the voters of Washing-
ton State to help make the legislature more representative of the people. 
The Initiative passed, only to have the legislature, in the spring of 
1957: amend it. The amended form of redistricting did very little in 
changing the districts, as the League had proposed. Senator Robert 
Greive indicated that this i ni ti ati ve had 11 politi cal consequences" that 
the League had not considered. There were many legislators who stood to 
lose their seats if the 1966 redistricting initiative had remained as 
passed. 
In 1962, the Supreme Court paved the way for the sweeping legis-
1 ative reapportionment. In the Case of Baker vs. Carr, it was noted 
that: 
_The· main legal point of the Baker case was the ·ruling 
that apportionment suits wereTuai ci ab le. 
This meant that now the Supreme Court would consider cases of malappor-
tioned state legislatures within its jurisdiction, and a flurry of cases 
began to appear on the federal dockets. The case in Washington was 
lBaker, Gordon E., The Reapportionment Revolution, Random 
House (N.Y., 1966), p. 101. 
2 
Thigpen vs. Meyers. The case was instituted in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Washington, Northern Division, 
in an attempt to force the legislature to reapportion the state. 
Throughout the next three years, the courts gave the legislature every 
opportunity to act upon redistricting. In June of 1962, the court 
heard argument, but, 11 ••• postponed action until after the November, 
1962, election. 112 
In 1962, the League of Women Voters again submitted a redistrict-
ing initiative to the people. This time the opposition was heavy and 
the initiative failed. The question of redistricting again returned to 
the courts. Arguments were heard, but the decision was delayed until 
after the legislature convened in the Spring of 1963. Both houses of 
the legislature were controlrled by the Democrats, and the Governor was 
a Democrat. However, even under these conditions no agreement was 
possible on redistricting. A few Democrats in the House of Represen-
tatives joined with the Republicans in the House and blocked any re-
districting bill. The question of reapportionment then went back to 
the courts and the Judge .war.ned that .if the Legislature did not pass 
on reapportionment, that the court would take over and do it. 
The remedies open to the judge were numerous. The 
court ·could reapportforr ·the ·legi·s·la ture; •it could 
appoint a master to reapportion the legislature in 
its behalf, it could declare the existing districts 
null and void and call for at-large legislative elections, 
or it could force the legislature to act using weighted 
votes, to name just a few of the alternatives. McDermott 
feels that the threat of at-.large .elections .was the 
most salient for the parties concerned.3 
2Best, James J., "The Impact of Reapportion~nt ,on the Washing-
ton House of Representatives", James Tobinson, (ed.), Legislative In-
novation, (Publisher unknown) (Forthcoming, 1971). 
3Ibid., p. 11. 
3 
The Federal District Court ruled that the 1957 redistricting 
laws were null and void and that no further elections could be held. At 
this point the state appealed the Thigpen case to the Supreme Court. Be-
fore ruling on the Thigpen case. the Supreme Court delivered its second 
landmark case. Reynolds vs. Simms, stating that: 
As a basic constitutional standard the Equal Protection 
Cl a use requires th at the seats in both houses of a 
bicameral state llgislature must be apportioned on a 
population basis. 
Following this decision, the Thigpen case was , upheld by the Supreme 
Court. There was some delay in the execution of the court's decision. 
but the resulting action was that the 1965 legislature was required to 
deal with the issue of redistricting prior . to any other state business. 
A leading party member indicated that one of the basic factors 
considered in redistricting was to save as many incumbents as possible. 
11 We might define the legislator's perception of his role in reapportion-
ment as that of disturbing the status quo as little as possible. 115 This 
was not entirely possible. as the control of the legislature was divided 
between the Democratic and Republican Parties. With continued threat 
of court intervention. a compromise was necessary if a redistricting 
were to be achieved by the legislature. Therefore. it was agreed that 
Democratic Senator Robert Greive would prepare a plan that would satisfy 
the Democrats in the Senate and Slade Gorton, working with Governor 
Daniel Evans, would submit the Republican version which would benefit 
Republicans in the House of Representatives. Even with this type of 
4Bartholomew 1 Paul c., Leadin~ Cases on the Constituion. Little-field, Adams & Co.• lTotowa. N.J., l9 7), p. 506. 
5sest, op. cit., p. 35. 
arrangement• it was not easy to complete the. redi s tri cti ng, as minority 
Democrats in the House feared the loss of their seats, and for good 
4 
reason, and voted against the House proposals recommended by Slade Gorton. 
The research and analysis carried on by the Republicans paid off, for 
the final passage of the Reapportionment Act stood to benefit the Repub-
lican Party to a much greater extent than the Democratic Party. Perhaps 
a lesson of this type will encourage a research staff in the Democratic 
Party on a more equal par with that of the Republican Party. An exami-
nation of the control of legislative districts before ·and ·after ·redi-strict-
i ng shows s i gni fi cant· increases· in· Republican strength: 
TABLE l 




Number of Districts 
1964 1968 
ff 
*Solidly Democratic or Republican means that eigher party won 
all seats in the district. 
a. 15 two-member districts. and 3 single-member districts 
b. 6 two-member districts and 2 three merrber districts. 
c. 4 three-member districts, 12 two-merrber districts and 
2 single-member districts. 
d. 25 two-member districts. 
e. 7 two-menber districts, and 1 three-member district. 
f. 16 two-menber districts. 
6see Bruce M. Haston, "Impact of Reapportionment on Election of 
1967 Legislature," Quorum, Vol. 1, Fall, 1966, pp. 1-2. 
The general philosophy adopted, then by both parties was to 
protect incunbents, and increase individual party strength within the 
House of Senate. 
The writer was told by one party that when it came to putting 
together three island and one peninsula to fonn a new distric·t, they 
really didn't know what to do with Island County, as it did not seem to 
have any commonality with any other area, but it was generally agreed 
by both Democrats and Republicans that "water and Republicans go to-
gether". As was stated by one party: 
Generally waterfront, view, and prestige property is owned 
by people of the higher income bracket and they tend to 
vote Republican. Also, in this new area a good nunber of 
retired people are to be found and they have jhe same 
propensity to vote for Republican candidates. 
Richard Schweitzer confided that in the drawfog of the lines for the 
L 
new Tenth District. the Republicans were confident of gaining control. 
It appears as though he did his homework well. The next chapter deals 
with a description of the new district, concentrating on three criteria. 
A description of the old districts will be presented. An examination 
will be made as to the role each portion played in its own district. 
General voting characteristics will be examined for each area as they 
previously existed, as well as the voting habits of the entire previous 
district. 
?statement by Senator Robert Grei ve, telephone conversation, 
March , 19 70 • 
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CHAPTER II 
DESCRIPTION OF APPORTIONED AREA 
Before analyzing the effects of redistricting, an examination of 
the Tenth District as it appeared before 1965 is necessary. This will 
permit analysis of the effect, if any, that the majority part of a 
district has on the minority part, especially if the minority part is 
geographically separated from the remainder of the district. The writer 
will attempt to observe whether, as each segment has a larger voice in 
the total district elections, the interest of the people of the district 
in the elections is increased. 
In the two elections prior to redistricting, Whidbey Island was 
part of the 38th Legislative District, which also comprised the City of 
Everett and the suburban precincts surrounding it. Of the total district, 
Whidbey Island represented only 9% of the total votes in the elections 
of 1962 and 1964. Chart No. 1, on page 8, shows the votfog statistics 
for the 38th Legislative District as it appeared in 1962 and 1964. For 
Congressional and Gubernatorial candidates, the Republicans received an 
oveNhelming majority on Whidbey Island, whereas the remainder of the 
district proved less Republican. In the position of State Representative, 
Whi dbey voters gave a majority of votes to the Repub 1 i can candidates, 
although not the same ljlajority as in the other races cited. It should 
be noted that in this race, two of the three State Representatives were 
Democrats, and one of those Democrats came from Mukilteo and maintained 
high rapport among the voters of the Island, which may have accounted 
6 
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CHART NO. l 
WHIDBEY ISLAND AND SNOHOMISH COUNTY 
VOTING RETURNS 
Votes Governor tong-
1962 Cast Ree. Dem ~ee 
Whi dbey Precincts 4325 2646 
Percent of Total 9% 66% 
Snohomish Precinct 41941 21778 
Percent of Total 91% 56% 
1964 
Whidbey Precincts 6067 3790 2170 3254 
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for the reasonably good Democratic showing. 
In the next chapter the issue of swing vote will be discussed for 
each are_a, which may help to explain a nunber of the following occurrences: 
In the Congressional race for the North Kitsap Area and Whidbey Island, 
Democrats netted substantial gains in 1966 and 1968 over the 1962 and 
1964 period. Also, Republicans gained considerably in the State Repre-
sentative race on Whidbey Island and Bainbridge Island during the same 
period. After redistricting in 1965, the 38th District was a "solid" 
Democratic District. To be "solid" a district must elect all of its 
representatives from one party. This was made possible because the 
Republican Whidbey area and the area that now comprises the 21st Dis-
trict, which is Republican, were taken from the 38th District. This 
created two Republican districts, the 10th and the 21st; and one Demo-
cratic district, the 38th. This two for one cont>ination is what gave the 
Republicans increased power in the House of Representatives. 
Camano.Island, a very Republican area (see Chart No. 2, page 10) 
is examined in the next secion. Tenth District, Camano was a part of 
the 39th District. Camano Island, in 1962 and 1964, represented 4% of 
the total district votes cast. The statistics on Chart No. 2, page 10, 
indicate that regardless of the effect of incuirbents, on the average 
Camano Island remained better than 55% Republican. The remainder of 
the 39th District was essentially Democratic, and following the redis-
tricting, the 39th District could be classified as "solid" Democratic, 
as the entire state delegation bore the Democratic label. 
From the 23rd District two segments were taken -· Bainbridge 
Isl and and North Ki ts ap County. In Ki ts ap County the division was 
made along the Eastern Shore of Dyes In 1 et, up to Si 1 verda le. and then 
1962 
Camano Preci nets 
Percent of Total 
CHART NO. 2 
CAMANO ISLAND AND REMAINDER OF 
39tH DISTRICT VOTING RETURNS 
Votes Governor ~ong. 
Ca~t Dem. Ree. Ree. 
820 426 
4% 57% 
39th District Precincts 17642 8925 
Percent of Total 
1964 
Camano Preci nets 
Percent of Total 
96% 56% 
1007 583 405 478 
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North to Hood Canal. Prior to redistricting, the North Kitsap Area 
(not including Bainbridge Island which will be treated separately} re-
presented about 31% of the total votes in the district. North Kitsap 
can be characterized by a large swing vote, as seen by the statistics 
on Chart No. 3, page 12. 
In 1962, North Kitsap gave 52% of her vote to the Democratic 
candidates for State Repre-sentative, whic;h. inc;l.uded two Democratic in-
cumbents, while giving 72% of the vote to the Republican Congressional 
incumbent. When voting the "ins" out became popular in 1964,_ this same 
Republican incurrt>ent received only 50% of the North Kitsap vote, which 
may not indicate the strength of the Republican power, but the size of 
the swing vote. North Ki ts ap _then• appears to be neither strongly 
Democratic or Republican, but controlled by a fairly large swing vote, 
which will be discussed later. As for the post-apportioned 23rd District, 
Democrats have remained in solid co.ntrol. 
The last area to be analyzed in Bainbridge Island which was a 
part of the 23rd Legislative District in Kitsap County and merrber of 
the First Congressional District from the Seattle Area. Bainbridge 
Island, in spite of ferry service to Seattle and a bridge 'to Kitsap 
County, is isolated. Bainbridge Island is an area of homes of Seattle 
commuters and retired people, and traffic through the island to the 
peninsula is minimal. Bainbridge- Island· is becoming an area of higher 
income homes, therefore, one would expect increasing Republican strength. 
As part of the 23rd District, Bainbridge Island represented only 8% of 
the total votes cast. Throughout the period both bef9re and after re-
dis tri cti ng • Bainbridge Is 1 and was. a Re pub 1 i can s trongho 1 d. Some Repµb-
1 i can candidqtes felt so confident that they never campaigned on the 
island and were still able to draw a majority of votes. In 1962, when 
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CHART NO. 3 
NORTH KITSAP COUNTY VOTING RETURNS 
Votes Govetnor Cong. 01s t. State ~ee. 
1962 Cast Ree. Oem. ~ee. Oem. Ree. 5em. 
North Kitsap Precincts 9239 6190 2352 12 ,418 13,648 
Percent of Total 31% 72% 38% 48% 52% 
Bainbridge Preci nets 2542 2001 488 4298 2287 
Percent of Total 8% 80% 20% 65% 35% 
1964 
North Kitsap Prec_incts 11 ,645 5853 5720 5420 5452 13,907 17,816 
Percent of Total 33% 51% 49% 50% 50% 44% 56% 
Bainbridge Precincts 3109 1935 1136 2292 496 4841 3477 
Percent of Total 9% 63% 37% 71% 29% 58% 42% 
13 
the Democrats had two of the three State Representative positions, 
Bainbridge Island gave 65% of the-v~te to the Republican candidates. In 
1964, a year in which it has been noted many times that the Republicans 
suffered a loss of votes, Bainbridge Island remained 68% Republican in 
the State Representative race. Some gain was ·made ·by the Democrats. as 
can be seen by Chart No. 3, page 12, but the area is definitely charac-
terized by a strong_ Republica_n ba_se and .a small swing vote. 
In the following chapter each of the four geographical areas 
will be examined as they now appear. Their partisan voting habits, the 
variety of influences such as the size and direction of the swing vote 
and the effect of the total vote on each segment will be the basis of 
analysis. 
CHAPTER I II 
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
REAPPORTIONMENT 
Even a cursory glance at the statistics of the new Tenth Dis-
trict indicates a strong Republican district. But, what changes actually 
occurred in the different areas following redistricting? What were the 
political effects of redistricting? A political description is pre-
sented which will make a picture of the whole district easier to under-
stand. 
Using the four elections of the 1960s, a swing vote was computed 
to help explore the political diversity of each area. The swing vote is 
not an accurate figure, and has a number of weaknesses. For example: 
A particular candidate may be bolted by a significant 
_ nulTber of his own part;t regulars who themselves woulfi 
nonnal ly be considered to be straight patty voters. 
An example of th-is occurred in Bainbridge Island in 1966 and will be 
discussed later. In calculating the swing vote, the modified pattern 
was followed on a district level that Richard Schweitzer. Jr., author 
of The 1968 Election in the State .of Washington, used on the county level. 
Using the four general elections of 1962 1 1964, 1966, and 1968, 
the lowest percentage of votes that any Republican candidate received 
was found to be the "hardcore" Republican vote. The saire procedures 
were used in de1;enninging · the "hardcore" Democr.atic vote_ and the remainder 
8schweitzer, Richard H., Jr., The 1968 Election in the State of 




of the 100% was the swing vote. The Democratic and Republican candidates 
were examined to determine the "hardcore" vote for each area. It was 
important, therefore, to note whether any candidate's percentage of 
vote fell substantially below that reported by any other candidate of 
the same party. Many ti mes a very weak, ineffective candidate may lose 
"hardcore" votes of his own party and thus di start the true size of the 
swing vote. This may have been true in the case of the swing vote on 
Bainbridge Island (see Bainbridge Island Congressional Election, 1966, 
Chart No. 3). The 13% Democratic vote recorded by Alice Franklin Bryant 
in 1966, it is believed, represents a loss of soire normally "hardcore" 
Democratic votes, and for this reason an explanation of these factors 
is included in the analysis of the swing vote on Bainbridge Island. This 
area will be discussed in depth later. 
The stability of the swing vote, which by the way is not dis-
cussed in the analysis by Richard Schweitzer, is another factor to be 
noted. It is believed by this writer that the swing vote calculated on 
the basis of one election is more variable than the one based on four 
elections. The longer the period of time under study, the more likli-
hood that the individual extremes are avoided. Our system of voting in, 
the primary elections encourages switching, although the "position" 
system adopted in conjunction with the 1965 Reapportionment Act will 
force voters to vote for .! Democratic can di date or .! Repub 1 i can candi-
date rather than the best of two candidates out of four or three out of 
six, as was the case in the State Representative position prior to re-
districting. However, as issues, and candidates change and as population 
shifts and changes, the intensity of the swing vote will change. For. 
example, in 1964, there was an intense anti-Goldwater feeling through-
16 
out the United States, not comparable to any election since the early 
1930s. The anti-Goldr'Jater feeling developed into a definite anti-Repub-
li can fee 1 i ng which affected many state can di dates th rough out the 
United States. Therefore. considering these factors. the "swing" per-
centages contained herein are not intended to be accurate over a period 
of years without proper verification. 
Whidbey Island has increased its influence ·in · the total ·district. 
Once only 9%. it now casts about 27% ·of ·the · total ·district vote. The 
swing vote for Whidbey demonstrates · the large ·positive ·strength·of the 
Republicans. but ·does ·not ·close ·the ·door · to·the ·possibility ·of ·Democra-
tic victory. as can be noted ·by the ·saccess ·of ·Congressman Meeds in 
1966 and .1968. 
wRIDBEY IstANb SwiNG voTE i§Gz-1968 
Republican Party •• . . . .44% 
Democra ti c Party • • • • • • • • 30% 
Swing Vote • • • • • • • • .26% 
These percentages compare very closely with what Richard Schweitzer had 
computed in his analysis of the political profile of Washington State. 
although his computations include all of Island County and these figures 
reflect Whidbey Island only. which constitutes 85% of the voting power 
of the district. 
In the second area. Camano Island increased its total influence 
in the district from 4% to 6%. Even though this is a 50% increase. 
Camano still remains but a minuscule part of the entire Tenth District. 
The voting returns following redistricting still indicate that Camano 
Island is a 11 safe 11 Republican area, that is, Republicans can count on a 
majority of votes for any candidate tha~ ~~e~.~ominate. The swing vote 
looks grim for any would-be Democratic can di date: 
CAMANo·rstAND SWING VOTE 1962-1968 
Republican Party ••••••• 47% 
Democratic Party • • 37% 
Swing Vote . . . . . . . . . •• 16% 
For a Democratic can di date to carry th·i s area, and few• ever have, he 
must carry all the Democratic votes and ·essentially all the swing votes 
to win. 
17 
Camano Island has one factor of conmonality with Whidbey Island, 
i.e., they are both members of Island County, and local candidates of 
one area readily become known to all voters. 
The largest of the three areas, Kitsap County, now comprises 50% 
of the total district vote, compared to 30% prior to redistricting. See 
the below for the level of partisan vote within the North Kitsap area. 
Although prior to redistricting Kits·ap County favored Democ'rati'c candi-
dates, th~ northern half did not have the_ same Democratic strength as 
that of the southern part. Examination of the precincts for a six year 
period, 1962 to 1968, included four general elections and shows the 
northern part of· Kitsap County demonstrates the level of the swing vote. 
Note the swing vote percentages below: 
NORTH KiTSAP co-DFJTV SCJfNG vott l962- l968 
Republican Party • • • • • • • • 38% 
Democratic Party • • •••• 38% 
Swing Vote • • • • • • • 24% 
18 
A characteristic of any district with a sizeable swing vote is 
that the voters tend to support incumbents• as incunbents have better 
naire familiarity, better organization, better financing and just plain 
experience that first-time candidates do not have. Switchers are those 
who can be swayed to change their general partisan voting habits by an 
effective campaign or a particularly exciting candidate. According to 
Angus Campbel 1, nearly 75% of all voters adopt the party of their 
parents• some to a more rigid degree than others. Parents who have 
little interest in politics generally breed the most political apathetic 
children. These apathetic voters are generally split •fifty-fifty be-
tween the Republican and Democratic Parties. It is from this group, as 
well as from the 75% group that the switchers come. 
Bainbridge Island comprises 15% of the present district, an 
increase of 7% over its potential strength in the 23rd District, and 
supports also a large swing vote, wh.ich, incidentally, is more Republi-
can than Democratic. Bainbridge Island has an extremely strong Republi-
can tendancy in all positions. Of the positions examined, no Republican 
candidate received less than 58% of the total vote. Using the same 
formula as previously, Bainbridge Island seemingly has a very small 
Democratic vote: 
sXINBRiDGE fsLANO swfNG VOTE 1962-1968 
Republican Party • • • • •• 58"/4 
Democratic Party • 
Swing Vote •••• 
. . . . •• 13% 
• 29% 
In this area it is believed that the swing vote as noted may 
include some voters generally considered "hardcore". Alice Franklin 
19 
Bryant received 13% of the total Democratic Congressional vote in 1966. 
On this basis one might conclude that only 13% of those voting were 
"hardcore" Democrats• but after some examination, a more accurate figure 
would be 20% Democratic and 22% swing. This is said because in 1966, 
when Alice Franklin Bryant ran for Congress, she chose to oppose a 
Republican candidate who, for many years. has represented Republicans in 
the First· Congressional District. In conversation with Congressman 
Pelly's .aide, he indicated that the Congressman had not even visited 
Bainbridge Island during the election an~ that he 'felt that his opponent 
offered very little competition. The factors that might have given Tom 
Pelly this overwhelming victory on Bainbridge Island are the prestige 
and name association that goes with an incurrbent, the party organization, 
necessary to operate a successful campaign, and avail ab le financial 
support. The financial expenditures in the primary election of Congress-
man Pelly were over twice the amount that Alice Franklin Bryant spent.9 
The success of Alice Franklin Bryant can only be judged by her ability 
to draw votes, and in this respect she did very poorly. 
In summary, the two small island, Camano and Bainbridge, appear 
to be strongly Republican with small swing voter percentages. Whidbey 
Island and North Kitsap appear to have large swing voter percentages. 
In the next chapter, extreme changes in voting percentages for the pre-
apportioned period, vis-a-vis, the post-1965 period will be examined. 
The State Representative position in Whidbey and Bainbridge Island will 
be examined to discuss the apparent change in voting behavior following 
redistricting. 
Lastly, we will compare the general voting trends of all of the 
9secretary of State, Elections Division, Olympia, Washington. 
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areas to their, voting trends prior to redistricting and atte.mpt to 
speculate as to the possible causes that brought about this change. In 
the final chapter, some ti me wi 11 be given to the possible future out-
look for Democrats and Republicans in the new Tenth District. 
CHART NO. 4 
10TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT 
VOTING RETURNS 
votes Governor · Con2~ 
1966 Cast Ree. Clem. Ree. 
Hhi dbey Preci nets 4571 1772 
Percent of Total 23% 44% 
Camano Precincts 832 374 
Percent of Total 5% 47% 
N. Kitsap Precincts 9842 3643 
Percent of Total 55% 38% 
Bainbridge Preci nets 2726 2440 
Percent -of Total 15% 87% 
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. o, st. State ~ep. 
Dem. Ree. Dem. 
2294 5942 2557 
56% 70% 30% 
430 970 559 
53% 63% 37% 
5999 8100 10039 
62% 45% 55% 
313 3795 1461 
13% 72% 28% 
1968 
Whi dbey Precincts 
Percent of Total 
Camano Precincts 
Percent of Total 
N. Kitsap Precincts 
Percent of Total 
CHART NO. 5 
10TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT 
VOTING RETURNS 
Votes · ~ovemor · · Con2. 
Cast □em. Ree. Ree. 
6996 4196 2559 2972 
29% 62% 38% 46% 
1042 571 435 474 
4% 57% 43% 49% 
12304 6027 5903 4530 
52% 51% 49% 40% 
Bainbridge Preci nets 3608 2377 1130 2733 
Percent of Total 15% 68% 32% 74% 
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o, st. ~tate ~ee. 
Dem. Ree. Dem. 
3517 9335 3879 
54% 71% 29% 
493 1196 722 
51% 62% 38% 
6916 11479 10923 
60% 51% 49% 
981 4017 2752 
26% 59% 41% 
CHAPTER IV 
SPECULATtON ON CAUSES OF 
CHANGES CREATED BY REAPPORTIONMENT 
It is evident that the Republicans set out to capture the Tenth 
District, as they spent six times more to promote their candidates in 
the primary than did the Democrats. The figures from the Secretary of 
State's office indicate this type of financial breakdown: 10 
Pat Wanamaker. Republican ••••• 
Charles Elicker, Republican •••• 
Arnold Wang, Republican •••• 
Pat Nicholson, Democrat •••••• 
Robert Snelson, Democrat •••••• 







In the State Representative race, Whidbey Island, a crucial area, showed 
an increase in its Republican support by 17% in 1966. Some factors con-
tributing to this were: Whidbey Island was essentially Republican, 
even before redistricting, and the redistricting created a situation 
where voters of Whi dbey Isl and could return to more nonnal voting pat-
terns. In addition to the basic Republican trend, and the better finan-
cial situation, the Republicans chose one candidate with name associa-
tion and some political experience. Pat Wanamaker, the Republican 
candidate from Whidbey Island, had two years ~arlier run for County 
Commissioner, and his Aunt, Pearl Wanamaker, former head of the State 
Department of Education, also resided on Whidbey Island. That is not 
to say that Pat Wanamaker won because he lived on Hhidbey Island, but 




11 he proved that 'home town ties•• in this instance Island County, are 
valuable to aspiring office seekers, regardless of party,labels. 1111 
In 1968, these 11 home town ties: were exploited further when the 
Republicans declared, 11 Don 1 t cancel Pat Wanamaker's vote, double it by 
electing Joe Mentor, triple it by electing Charlie Elicker, 1112 ; and, 
as a slogan for Pat Wanamaker. "Let's keep Island County's voice in 
State Government. 1113 
Redistricting made it possible for areas such as Whidbey and 
Camano Island, which comprise Island County, for the first time to be 
directly represented in state government. It gave to the people of 
Island County, and Bainbridge Island, the opportunity to be heard in 
Olympia, hence more interest could be created in the Republican Party 
locally as they provided this "new voice" in Olympia. 
Another position that changed considerably concurrent with the 
redistricting was the s.tate representative race on Bainbridge Island. 
The statistics on Chart No. 3, indicate the Republican gain. The rea-
sons for this change I believe can be attributed to the same factors as 
caused the change in the State Representative race on Whidbey Island. 
Charlie Elicker, from Bainbridge Island, ran for ·the State Representa-
tive Position Nunber Two. His Democratic opponent, Harvey Rude, had 
little financial support and was new to politics. Although Elicker's 
11whidbey News Times, The, (Volume 75 • No. 1} Sept. 22, 1966, 
p. 1. 
12whidbey News Times, The, (Volume 77 • No. 7} Oct. 31, 1968, 
p. 14. 
13Ibid., p. 22. 
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name was not as well known as Wanamaker's, he was eloquent, personable, 
and had a distinct resemblance to Teddy Roosevelt. This res~mblance 
was further encouraged, as Charles Elicker wore metal-rimmed glasse~ and 
sported the same type mustache as was worn by Teddy Roosevelt. In 
addition, Teddy Roosevelt's picture appeared in the background on 
Elicker' s propaganda material. Th'erefore • the fact that Bainbridge Isl and 
went Republican should not surprise anyone, and the increase in Republi-
can support is understandable under the circumstances. In addition to 
strong local party support and well qualified candidates, national fac-
tors could also have· contributed to increased Republican strength. 
On the national scene, Republicans in 1966 and 1968 were re-
gaining support lost after the Goldwater Fiasco, even to the point of 
electing Richard Nixon, a two-time loser, to the White House. In the 
post-redistricting period, people in general were concerned with crime, 
violence, inflation and the Viet Nam War. Although they may not have 
been convinced that Republicans had the answers, many may have thought 
it was time to give them a chance. 
In summary, three Republican areas, Whidbey Island, Camano 
Island and Bainbridge Island were corrbined with a fairly large swing 
area, North Kitsap County, to form one new district. People take more 
interest in voting when the elections directly affect them, or when they 
feel that their vote counts. Redistricting meant for these areas a 
greater voice in elections, a greater share in democracy. 
CHAPTER V 
FUTURE OUTLOOK 
The incidents that brought about the 1965 Reapportionment Act 
were years in the making. Citizen involvement, court action and finally 
legislative change occurred in a process of give. and take over a period 
of years before what we now have, in 1965, was born. Si nee the Supreme 
Court actions of Baker vs. Carr and Reynolds vs. Simms, states were put 
on notice that the courts would no longer tolerate the type of mal appor-
tioned legislatures that existed in many of the states prior to 1965. It 
would appear then that with the present court decisions available, the 
legislature will no longer require the inducements to redistricting that 
were required earlier. In fact, in conversation with Senator Robert 
Greive, he indicated that the Democrats were now planning for what nec-
essary reapportionment would be required as a result of the dicennial 
census currently being taken. 
One interesting result of the events that brought about the 
past redi stri cti ng was a greater interest on the part of party officials 
in voting analysis. At the outset of this study an attempt was made to 
gather as much data as possible relating to political motivations for 
redi s tri cti ng. Inquiries were made as to what type of studies had been 
carried on by both political parties prior to the drawing of legislative 
lines, and found that the Republicans had a program of research going 
on, on a more or less continuous basis, whereas the Democratic Party 
had neglected research. Dr. Hugh Bone, of the Political Science Depart-
26 
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ment of the University of Washington, indicated that he too was surprised 
at the lack of research facilities and personnel in the Democratic 
Party, even at ~e national level. Democratic Senator Robert Greive 
indicated that the Democratic Party would like to begin the same type 
of survey, but at the moment lacked the personnel. Richard Schweitzer, 
a menter of the Republican Research Staff, provided me with a copy of an 
analysis of the 1968 election on a county basis, and indicated that an 
analysis of the party strength was being done on a precinct by precinct 
basis with the use of computers. 
Perhaps now the Democrats will begin building a research staff, 
and when the next opportunity for redistricting presents itself, they 
will not find themselves on the short end of the redistricting stick. 
This is not to infer that the Republican Research Staff alone was respon-
sible for the vast change in legislative district control, as was noted 
on page 4, for the Republicans put forth many good candidates, gave 
financial support adequate to the cause, in addition to having a national 
Republican trend following 1964. 
But. what then of the new Tenth District? The Office of Program 
Plann~ng and Fiscal Management at Olympia indicated the followi.ng 






1967 1968 1969 
23,542 24,044 24,700 
96,683 96,357 102,800 
Mr. David Weig of the Office of Program Planning and Fiscal 
Management, indicated that Island County was one of the fastest growing 
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areas in terms of percentage of population growth, but this was only a 
small numerical increase since the total population was small. Over the 
past nine years, Island County has e?<,perienced a 25% increase and Kitsap 
County has experienced a 22% increase. It would appear that the compara-
tive voting power of Island County in relation to the KHsap County por-
tion will not substantially change in the next two or three years. Fed-
eral employment is being reduced in the Ki ts ap County Area. A reduction 
in The Boeing Company employees near Everett may have a tendency to slow 
population growth in both areas. Als-o, there appears to be a national 
trend toward cutting military installations to save money, which could 
further reduce the size of the military post at Oak Harbor in Island 
County. In respect to the element of population, no more . than a moderate 
change will occur in the basic Tenth District, unless changes relative 
to defense and the aircraft industry experience a rapid turnabout. 
I 
The Tenth District, it is believed by the writer, will remain 
Republican for some time to come unless or until: 
(1) The North Kitsap area takes on a De~ocratic provincial out-
look, which at the moment looks unlikely, to offset the highly Republi-
can vote of the remainder of the district. 
(2) A popular Democratic can di date from Isl and County consents 
to run, in which case he could dominate both the North Kitsap Area and 
the Whidbey. Island Area in an easy victory, but no Democrat is going to 
find a victory easy in the present Tenth District, for all incumbents in 
the State Legislature are now Republican. 
(3) Lastly. if an anti-Republican trend occurs at a time when 
the Republican incumbents tend to be ineffective, good Democratic can-
di dates stand a chance of winning. 
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In.addition to this, both parties generally reserve their finan-
cial support for areas that seem roost promising, and in this respect 
Democrats will continue to find financing of campaigns difficult in the 
Tenth District, while Republicans will be well supported. The best sug-
gestion for candidates in the Democratic Party who aspire to the state 
legislature is, (1) don't run unless you are from Island County. and; 
(2) run during a presidential electi~n. as this is the time for greatest 
Democratic support. 
As for Republicans, maintain control of.the Island County Area 
and victory wi 11 be yours. 
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